Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 52

Issue 3

Article 2

1964

Suggestions for Modernizing the Kentucky General Corporation
Law to Meet the Needs of Close Corporations
Willburt D. Ham
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Ham, Willburt D. (1964) "Suggestions for Modernizing the Kentucky General Corporation Law to Meet the
Needs of Close Corporations," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 52: Iss. 3, Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol52/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Suggestions for Modernizing the
Kentucky General Corporation
Law to Meet the Needs of
Close Corporations
By WnimuRT D. HAM*
The renewed interest in the close corporation,' which has
become so increasingly evident since World War II,2 is now
finding expression in legislative revisions of corporation codes.

Heretofore, lawyers have found it necessary to rely heavily on
their own initiative or on that of the judiciary to supply gaps in

close corporation law left open in corporation statutes.' Sometimes these statutes have been so framed as to lead to judicial
opinions thwarting efforts on the part of lawyers to mold the
internal organizational structure of a closely held corporation to
meet the legitimate business desires of its members. 4 However,
legislative recognition that the close corporation has distinctive
characteristics which call for special treatment in corporation
statutes is becoming increasingly apparent.
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.S., LL.B.,
University of Illinois; LL.M., Harvard University.
The term "close corporation" is not easily defined. Such a corporation is
characterized by its limited membership, by the active participation of its members
in the management of corporate affairs, and by the lack of active trading in its
stock.
2 This interest was highlighted by the appearance in 1958 of the excellent
treatise on close corporations written by Professor F. Hodge O'Neal. See O'Neal,
Close Corporations: Law and Practice (2 vols. 1958).
3See Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 485 (1958), in which the author says:
Clearly, the law of corporations never was and is not entirely statutory.
In a no-man's land unoccupied by the legislature, the 'incorporated
partnership,' for example, is a reality. Its vitality is conclusively demonstrated by flourishing practices, office files, and judicial opinions. Not
the legislature, but the judges (who must deal with lawyers) and the
lawyers (who must deal with clients) have quickened into life a type
of business organization needed to meet the exigencies of the market
place.
4 See, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
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Provisions designed to meet the special needs of the close
corporation are particularly evident in the new Business Corporation Law of New York,5 effective September 1, 1963, and the new
Business Corporation Act of South Carolina,' which became
effective on January 1, 1964. Such provisions also dominate the
present North Carolina Business Corporation Act, which became
effective on July 1, 1957.7 To a lesser extent close corporation
provisions appear in the American Bar Association Model Business
Corporation Act s which has been enacted in substantially its
recommended form in some thirteen jurisdictions, 9 and in the
existing statutes of such important commercial states as California, 10 Illinois," and Ohio."2 During 1963, the Florida legislature responded to the renewed interest in the close corporation
by adopting an act relating to close corporations.' This "act"
consists of a series of special provisions designed to relax the

legal restrictions applicable to close corporations in Florida.14
In a recent article the present writer suggested that, while
there was no reason to view with alarm the status of the close

corporation in Kentucky, nevertheless there was room for im-

provement in the provisions of the Kentucky general corporation
statute aimed at clarifying existing areas of uncertainty in close
corporation law and at establishing a firmer legislative foundation

for this type of corporation in Kentucky.' 5 Therefore, it seems
appropriate at this time to offer a few specific suggestions as to
ways in which Kentucky might "modernize" its corporation
statute so as to reflect recent legislative trends in adapting corpoGN.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 101 to 1401.

6S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-11.1 to -24.9 (Supp. 1962).
7 N.C. Gen Stat. §§ 55-1 to -175 (repl. vol. 1960).
8 See Campbell, The Model Business CorporationAct, 11 Bus. Law. 98, 104,
106 (July 1956).
9 These jurisdictions are: Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. The Model Business Corporation Act is a product of the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association. For the history of the preparation and publication of
this act, see 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 1, 1 4.02 (1960).
1O Cal. Corp. Code Ann. §§ 100 to 6804 (Deering 1962).
11 ll. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 32, §§ 157.1 to .167 (Smith-Hurd perm. ed. 1954).
12 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1701.01 to .99 (Page Supp. 1962).
13 See I P-H Corp. Serv., Rep. Bull. No. 3, July 31, 1963, II 3.2.
'4 See 2 P-H Corp. Serv., Fla. 15-16A (1963).
The "act" defines a close
corporation as "a corporation for profit whose shares of stock are not generally
traded5 in the markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers."
' Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50 Ky. L.J. 125, 198
(1961).
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ration codes more precisely to the practical needs of the close
corporation.'" These suggestions will be discussed in relation to
three phases of corporate life-organization, operation, and dissolution.
ORGANIZATION
1. Single incorporator
At the outset, in connection with organizational procedures,
it is significant to note that in 1954 Kentucky moved to the forefront in relation to one aspect of close corporation law. In that
year the Kentucky General Assembly amended the corporation
statute so as to permit the use of a single incorporator for a
Kentucky thereby became the fourth
Kentucky corporation.
state to grant such a privilege. At that time, the only other states
recognizing a single incorporator were Iowa,' s Michigan, 9 and
Wisconsin. 0 Since then Iljinois,2 Nebraska,2 2 New York,2 3 Oregon,2 4 South Carolina,25 and Wyoming26 have joined this list of
states, and it is reasonable to assume that the list of states per27
mitting use of the single incorporator will continue to grow.

These new enactments provide additional confirmation for the
viewpoint that the one-man company is a "legitimate" corpora'6 Dean Daniel J. Dykstra of the University of Utah College of Law, in
pointing up the significance of a corporation statute providing definitive answers
to questions which tend to reoccur in the organization and functioning of
corporations, commented that "it is not enough that answers to such questions
can be found in the recesses of judicial opinions, for the facts of life are such
that lawyers all too frequently look only to statutes as their source of aid in
advising corporations, and if the desired guidance is not to be found therein
demands on time and energy cause them to 'play by ear."' Dykstra, Gaps,
Ambiquities and Pitfalls in the Utah Corporation Code, 4 Utah L. Rev. 439, 440
(1955).7

1 Ky. Acts 1954, ch. 33.

18wa
Code Ann. § 491.2 (1949) (old Iowa general corporation statute).
Permission for one person to incorporate has been retained in the new Iowa
Business Corporation Act, which became effective on July 4, 1959. See Iowa Code
Ann. § 496A.48 (Supp. 1961).
19 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.3 (Supp. 1961).
2o Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.44 (1957).
2
1 The change from the former requirement of a minimum of three incorporators became effective in Illinois on July 1, 1963. See 3 P-H Corp. Serv., I//. 65

(1963).

224 P-H Corp. Serv., Neb. 41 (1963).
23 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 401.
24 5 P-H Corp. Serv., Ore. 37 (1963).

25 S.C. Code Ann. § 4.2 (Supp. 1962).
26

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-36.45 (Supp. 1961).
The likelihood that this will occur has been increased by recognition of
the single incorporator in the 1962 revision of the section on incorporators in the
Model Business Corporation Act. See ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 47
(1959, 1962 Addendum) (hereinafter cited as Model Bus Corp. Act).
27
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tion,2 8 and they remove the necessity for the use of "accommodaion" incorporators, a practice which is not altogether free from
the possibility of unexpected legal responsibilities on the part of
29
the accommodation parties.
Although Kentucky is one of the states that now gives recognition to the use of the single incorporator, an anomalous situation
for Kentucky attorneys existed until recently by the retention in the
corporation statute of the requirement that the articles of incorporation be acknowledged by at least three of the incorporators. 30 This obvious inconsistency with the concept of the single
incorporator can no doubt be traced to legislative oversight at
the time of the 1954 amendment eliminating the requirement
of a minimum of three incorporators, and the attorney general of
Kentucky had expressed the opinion that since one person may
now form a corporation in Kentucky, only that person (as incorporator) needs to acknowledge the articles of incorporation.3 '
The 1964 General Assembly corrected this situation by changing
the acknowledgment requirement so as to permit the articles of
incorporation to be acknowledged by only one of the incorpo2
rators .3
28See I O'Neal, Close Corporations § 1.05 (1958).

Failure to give full

legislative recognition to the one-man company may cause a court to treat a
corporation as dormant or inactive if one person acquires all of its stock. See
Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S.W. 531 (1893); Park
Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 478, 85 S.E.2d 677 (1955), on
rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956). The North Carolina legislature
responded to the decision in the Park Terrace case by enacting curative legislation
designed to remove the concept of "dormancy." See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-3.1(d)
(repl. vol. 1960). Missouri enacted similar legislation in 1961. See Mo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 351.050 (Vernon Supp. 1962). The new Florida close corporation
"act' also contains a provision rejecting the "dormancy" concept. See 2 P-H
Corp. Serv., Fla. 15 (1963).
29 See Note, Use of Accommodation Incorporators, Directors, Officers: Potential Liability of Accommodation Personnel, 47 Cornell L.Q. 443 (1962).
30 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 271.055 (1959) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
31 Ops. Att'y Gen. No. 42,878 (February 27, 1959).
32H.B. 164, Ky. General Assembly, Re . Sess. § 1 (1964). There is some
support for dispensing with the acknowledgment requirement as an unnesessary formality. This step was taken in the 1955 revision of the Ohio General Corporation Law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.04 (Page Supp.
1962). In 1959, the Pennsylvania legislature delected a requirement in the
corporation statute of that state that the articles of incorporation be acknowledged
by at least two of the incorporators. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-204 (Purdon
Supp. 1962). A similar change has taken place in the organizational requirements
prescribed by the Model Business Corporation Act. The 1962 Addendum to this
act changed the wording of § 47 from "signing, verifying and delivering . . .
articles of incorporation,' to merely "signing and delivering
. . articles of
incorporation." See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 47 (1959, 1962 Addendum).
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2. Conditions precedent to beginning business
Perhaps one of the most troublesome features of the present
Kentucky corporation statute with respect to organizational matters is the provision pertaining to liability in case of violation of
the section prescribing the conditions precedent to beginning
business. This provision states that if a corporation transacts any
business without having complied with such conditions precedent,
the participating officers and the directors, except those directors
who dissent, are to be treated as severally liable for the debts or
liabilities of the corporation arising from such business.33 Since
one of the conditions precedent to be complied with is the election of the first board of directors by the shareholders 34 and since
the important corporate officers, such as the president, vicepresident, secretary, and treasurer, are elected by the board of
directors, 3 it is entirely possible that there will be no directors or
officers in the technical legal sense to whom the liability provision
can be made to apply. Yet business may have been transacted
in violation of the section. Although the Kentucky Court of
Appeals made use of the "de facto officer" concept in a recent
case to fill this gap,3 it appears that a legislative modification of
the liability provision would be the most effective solution to the
problem. 7
Ohio came to grips with a somewhat similar problem in the
1955 revision of its corporation statute. Prior to that time the
Ohio statute had imposed a liability for debts of a corporation
up to the amount of the initial unpaid stated capital on directors
participating in a corporate transaction before such initial capital
had been paid in.3 8 Despite the limitation on total liability speci3KRS

271.095(2).

34The other conditions precedent which must be complied with are (1)

filing of an original of the articles of incorporation with the county clerk, (2
paying in the initial stated capital, and (3) establishing the registered office and
process agent as prescribed by KRS 271.385.
35 KRS 271.355.
36Tri-State Developers, Inc. v. Moore, 848 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1961).
37
Another approach would be to name the first board of directors in the
articles of incorporation, such as required by the Uniform (Model) Business
Corporation Act, from which the Kentucky liability provision was taken. The
Uniform Act, promulgated in 1928 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and later redesignated as a Model Act, was withdrawn
from active promulgation by this group in 1957. See 9 U.L.A. 115 (1957, Supp.
1962, at 48).
38 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.16 (Page 1954).
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fed by this provision, an intermediate Ohio appellate court held
incorporators of a defectively formed corporation fully liable on a
tort obligation attributable to the corporation.39 In the 1955
revision of the corporation statute the language of this provision
was changed to cover "incorporators participating in such transaction before the election of directors, and directors participating
therein," 40 the purpose apparently being to limit the liability of
incorporators as well as directors to the amount of the deficiency
in stated capital.41
A similar revision in language could be adopted in Kentucky
by specifying that if a corporation has transacted any business
without having complied with the conditions precedent to beginning business, "the incorporators participating therein before the
election of directors, and officers and directors participating

therein" shall be severally liable for the debts and liabilities of
the corporation arising from such business.4 2 However, use of the
term "incorporators" would still leave a potential gap in the
Kentucky statutory provision since persons other than incorporators (or other than directors or officers) may be responsible for
the challenged transactions. An even more satisfactory solution
for Kentucky, therefore, would appear to be that contained in the
new South Carolina Business Corporation Act. It is there stated
that if a corporation transacts any business in violation of the
section prescribing the conditions precedent for doing business
9any person (whether a promoter, incorporator, shareholder, subscriber, or director) who has participated therein, shall be jointly
and severally liable for the debts or liabilities of the corporation
39 Beck v. Stimmel, 39 Ohio App. 510, 177 N.E. 920 (1931).
40 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.12 (Page Supp. 1962).
41 See Emerson, The New Ohio General Corporation Law:

Some Comments
and Some Comparisons, 24 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 463, 470-71 (1955). There may be
some question whether the amended language actually reaches the Beck case
itself, since that case involved no "transaction" but rather an injury to a third
party growing out of failure to maintain premises in proper condition and there
was arguably not a "debt," which denotes a contractual obligation, but instead a
"liability. A similar problem may lurk in the Kentucky statutory language since
it refers to transaction of business and liability for the debts or liabilities of the
corporation arisingtherefrom. See KRS 271.095(2).
42This approach is used in the Connecticut Stock Corporation Act, which
provides that if a corporation commences business before it has received the
minimum stated capitar with which it is to commence business "the directors, or,
if the directors have not then been elected, the incorporators, who assent thereto
shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for such part thereof has
not been received before commencing business." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-295
(Rev. to 1962).
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arising therefrom." 43 This language, or language similarly broad
in scope, 44 would give to the Kentucky liability provision a cover45
age more consistent with its apparent meaning.
3. Organizationalmeetings
Corporation statutes typically provide for an organizational
meeting or meetings to complete the organization of a corporation
after the filing of the articles of incorporation. The Kentucky
statute provides for two such meetings. There is provision for a
first meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of electing directors, for the purpose of making bylaws (unless the articles give
this power to the directors), and for such other purposes as
shall be stated in the notice of the meeting.4 6 Provision is then
made for an organization meeting of the board of directors for
the purpose of adopting bylaws (if this power has been given to
the board), for the purpose of electing officers, and for the transaction of such other business as comes before the meeting.47
These provisions, like those of a similar nature in other
corporation statutes, assume that actual meetings will be held for
such purposes. However, in the organization of the typical close
corporation, there is likely to be considerable temptation to
ignore the formal ritual of holding actual "meetings" for these
purposes. To meet this situation, New York has provided in its
new Business Corporation Law that any action permitted to be
taken at the organization meeting, which under the statute consists in a meeting of the "incorporator or incorporators," may be
taken without a meeting "if each incorporator or his attorney-infact signs an instrument setting forth the action so taken."48
43 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-14.6(b) (Sup . 1962). Georgia imposes liability on
"persons who organize a corporation an transact business." Ga. Code Ann.
§ 22-1872 (Supp. 1961). In Arkansas liability is extended to "directors and
stockholders."
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-607 (repl. vol. 1957).
44
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.93 (1957), which imposes liability on
"the incorporators and the subscribers for stock, shareholders and officers transacting such business or authorizing the same, or consenting to the incurring of any
debt or liability."
45 The opportunity for dissent could be retained as in the present provision.
The South Carolina statute, for example, provides: "No such person shall be
personally liable if he (1) dissented from such violation and caused his dissent
to be recorded in the records of the corporation, or (2) being absent, recorded
and filed his dissent promptly upon learning of the action." S.C. Code Ann.
§ 21-14.6(b)
(Supp. 1962).
46 KJS 271.345(2).
47KRS 271.345(3).
48 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 404(b).
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While the Kentucky statute presently contains a general provision which permits action by shareholders to be taken without a
meeting, 49 no such similar privilege is extended to directors. Thus,
although the need for an organization meeting of shareholders
might be considered as dispensed with by this statutory provision,
no such informal action by the board of directors would carry
statutory approval. The addition of a specific provision to the
Kentucky statute dispensing with the need for holding actual
organizational meetings, such as has been done in New York,
would serve to remove all possible doubt as to the validity of
informal action at the organizational stage, whether involving
shareholders or directors. Such a statutory provision, if enacted
in Kentucky, would also be consistent with the recognition in
Kentucky of the one-man company with its single incorporatorowner.
4. Corporatepurposes
The Kentucky corporation statute states that a corporation
may be formed for "any lawful purpose," 50 and states that the
articles of incorporation shall set forth the "purpose" for which
the corporation has been formed.-" This language taken literally
suggests that a Kentucky corporation must confine itself to a
single line of business activity. Since such a restriction would
run counter to the customary authorization in modern corporation
statutes for corporations to be formed for any lawful "purpose or
purposes," 52 an amendment to the Kentucky corporation statute
seems to be needed so as to make it clear beyond doubt that
Kentucky corporations, as corporations elsewhere, may be formed
to engage in one or in several lines of business activity. While it
is true that diversification is more likely to be a characteristic of
the large publicly held corporation than the small closely held
corporation, nevertheless the proper framing of the purpose
clause in the articles of incorporation remains of importance in
all corporations, whether large or small.55
49 KRS 271.405.

50 KRS 271.025.
51 KRS 271.035(1) (b).
52
See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 3 (1959).
53 In five states, Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, the
corporation statutes authorize use of a statement in the articles of incorporation
to the effect that the corporation shall have power to engage in any lawful
(Continued on next page)
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1. The board of directors

There is probably no principle of corporation law which has
been repeated more frequently or which has influenced judicial
opinions more directly than that which states that the business
management of a corporation shall be vested in a board of
directors.54 Indeed, so basic is this management concept that it
has long been customary to include a provision to this effect in
corporation codes. 5 The entrenched nature of this concept easily
leads to an assumption that the use of a board of directors is an
inherent characteristic of corporateness. However, it has been
persuasively argued that there is no historical basis for such an
assumption and that the shareholders of a corporation should be
allowed to decide for themselves whether they wish the corporate
business to be managed by a board of directors.-" Nevertheless,
there is little evidence in either existing or new corporation
statutes that the board of directors can be completely by-passed, 5
although there is increasing evidence in the new statutes that
arrangements restricting the powers of the board are to be considered as proper.
New York has given special attention to this aspect of close
corporation law in its new Business Corporation Law. It is there
provided that "subject to any provision in the certificate of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

business activity. See Iowa Code Ann. § 496A.49 (Supp. 1961) (new Iowa
Business Corporation Act); Nev. Rev. Stat. tit. 7, § 78.035 (1957); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 180.45(1) (c) (1957); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-36.46 (Supp. 1961). The
Oregon statutory provision became effective on September 2, 1963, as part of an
extensive revision of the Oregon Business Corporation Act. See 5 P-H Corp. Serv.,
Ore. 538 (1963).
4 See Ballantine, Corporations § 42 (rev. ed. 1946).
5 See, e.g., KRS 271.345.
5
6 Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate
Anachronism,
27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696 (1960).
57
In his study of the board requirement, Kessler found only three states
that did not expressly require a board of directors. These were the states of
Arizona, Iowa (under its old law), and Mississippi. Kessler, supra note 56 at 712,
n. 76 (1960). Mississippi can no longer be considered as a member of this group
of states since the adoption of its new Business Corporation Act, effective January
1, 1963, which contains the Model Act requirement of a board of directors.
See Miss. Code Ann. § 5309-71 (Supp. 1962). Likewise, the new Iowa Business
Corporation Act contains the Model Act requirement. See Iowa Code Ann.
§ 496A.34 (Supp. 1961). However, persons may still elect to incorporate under
the old Iowa general corporation statute. The new Florida close corporation
"act" provides that the articles of incorporation of a close corporation may make
provision for management by the stockholders instead of by a board of directors,

provided that "there be not less than three stockholders." See 2 P-H Corp. Serv.,

Fla. 15 (1963).
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incorporation authorized by paragraph (b) of section 6208 . . .
the business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of
directors. . . . 39 Section 620(b) authorizes the inclusion of a
provision in the certificate of incorporation restricting the powers
of the board of directors if such provision is authorized by the
incorporators or holders of record of all outstanding shares (including non-voting shares) even though the provision would be
"otherwise prohibited by law as improperly restrictive of the
discretion or powers of the board in its management of corporate
affairs. "6 0 The section further provides that the existence of such

a provision must be noted conspicuously on the face or back of
every certificate for shares issued by the corporation 1 and that
such a provision remains valid only so long as the shares of the
corporation are not listed on a national securities exchange or
regularly quoted on an over-the-counter market. 2 This latter
requirement emphasizes the applicability of the section to the
close corporation and removes the availability of the section for
use in a corporation that loses its closely held characteristics.
The new South Carolina Business Corporation Act, which also
permits departures from the "corporate norm" of director control,6 3 bases permission for such departures, as in New York, on
58 The term "certificate of incorporation" is used in the New York statute to
refer to the document which in Kentucky and other states is called the "articles
of incorporation." The term "certificate of incorporation" is used in Kentucky
to refer to the document issued by the Secretary of State upon the filing of the
articles of incorporation with him as prescribed by law. See KBS 271.055. For
the variety of terms used in corporation statutes to describe the "articles of
incorporation," see 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice § 74 (1959).
59 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 701. Dean Stevens has suggested that this section
is susceptible to interpretation as meaning either (1) that the certificate may
provide for management otherwise than by a board of directors, or (2) that there
must be a board of directors but § 620(b) permits the creation of a sterilized
board. Stevens, Close Corporations and the New York Business Corporation Law
of 1961,
11 Buffalo L. Rev. 481, 490 (1962).
60
In Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporationin New York Under
Its New Business CorporationLaw, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 10 (1961), the author
says: 'It is clear . . . that there are no limitations, if section 620 is satisfied, on
the extent to which the authority of the board can be invaded. Presumably, the
board can be deposed of authority entirely and 'put to bed."'
61 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(g).
62 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(c). Validity is further dependent on the
requirement that any subsequent transfer or issuance of stock after the initial
adoption of the certificate provision be made only to persons who have knowledge
or notice of the provision or who have consented in writing to such provision.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b)(2).
63 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-18.1 (Supp. 1962). A South Carolina writer points
out that while this section does not specifically authorize the abolishment of the
board of directors, there is no clear mandate with which such abolition would
(Continued on next page)
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unanimous shareholder approval.64 However, under the South
Carolina statutory provision, the agreement does not need to be
set forth in the articles of incorporation if its existence (whether
in the bylaws or in a written side agreement) is clearly referred
to in the articles.6 5
In contrast with the New York and South Carolina statutory
provisions, both of which require any departure from director
control to carry the approval of all the shareholders, the North
Carolina Business Corporation Act broadens the departure privilege to include agreements among "all or less than all" of the
shareholders which interfere with the discretion of the board of
directors."6 This North Carolina provision is significant in view
of the judicial tendency to look with disfavor on agreements
67
among less than all the shareholders which limit board control.
In Haldeman v. Haldeman, s the Kentucky Court of Appeals
refused to uphold an agreement among three of four shareholders
in a closely held corporation involving an attempt to control
action at the director as well as at the shareholder level. While
the Kentucky court would be in a position to distinguish this case
from one in which all the shareholders were parties to the agreement, 9 there would still remain the question as to how far such
unanimous shareholder agreements may go in "sterilizing" the
board of directors.70 The addition of a specific provision to the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

be inconsistent. Folk, The Model Act and The South Carolina Corporation Law
Revision, 18 Bus. Law 351, 363 (1963). This same writer suggests that one
advantage which may exist in continuing the use of a board is its usefulness in

underscoring the separate legal entity of the corporation and minimizing the

likelihood of undue confusion between corporate and personal business affairs.
Id. at 363-64.
64

6

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.22(b)(2)(Supp. 1962).

5S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.22(b) (1) (Supp. 1962). The term of the agreement, however, cannot exceed ten years, subject to renewal. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-16.22(b) (3). This time limitation keeps such agreements in line with
similar time restrictions of ten years on voting trusts, irrevocable proxies, and
shareholder
voting agreements.
66
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-73(c)(repl. vol. 1960). The new Florida close
corporation "act" contains a similar provision. See 2 P-H Corp. Serv., Fla. 16
(1963).
67 See e.g., the New York case of McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189
N.E. 234 (1934).

68176
Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917).
6
9 See, e.g., Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
70
In Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174,
77 N.E.2d 633 (1948), the New York Court of Appeals struck down an agreement among all the shareholders of a theatre corporation because the infringement

on the power of the directorate was too drastic.
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Kentucky statute establishing a legislative foundation for shareholder agreements restricting director control, even if based on a
requirement of unanimous shareholder consent as in New York
and South Carolina, would help to eliminate uncertainties as to
the legality of such agreements which otherwise will no doubt
continue to exist in the absence of statute or judicial decision.
Assuming that a board of directors is to remain a requirement
for all corporations, whether large or small, relief is needed in the
two-man and one-man corporation from the customary requirement that the board consist of a minimum of three persons.71
Use of "dummy" directors carries risks not only for the owner or
owners of the business should such directors suddenly assert
themselves and thwart the wishes of the true owners 2 but also
for the directors themselves in the form of personal liabilities
never contemplated by them.7" A recent California case 4 illustrates this latter risk. Defendant, an attorney-at-law, had assisted
in the organization of a corporation to operate a public swimming
pool and, according to his statements, had assumed the position
of an officer and director of the corporation temporarily as an
accommodation to his clients. Plaintiffs' daughter drowned in the
pool and plaintiffs obtained a judgment against the corporation
for wrongful death. However, the judgment remained unsatisfied
because the corporation had been organized without any substantial assets. Plaintiffs then brought an action against the
defendant to hold him personally liable for the judgment against
the corporation. On appeal from a judgment entered by the trial
court for plaintiffs, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court observed:
It is immaterial whether or not he [the defendant] accepted the office of director as an 'accommodation' with the
understanding that he would not exercise any of the duties of
a director. A person may not in this manner divorce the
responsibilities of a director from the statutory duties and
powers of that office. 75
USee, e.g., KRS 271.845(1); "The business of every corporation shall be
managed by a board of at least three directors ......
72See I O'Neal, Close Corporations § 3.13 (1958).
73 See Note, Use of Accommodation Incorporators, Directors, Officers: PoLiability of Accommodation Personnel, 47 Cornell L.Q. 448 (1962).
tential
74
Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 364 P.2d 473 (1961).
75 364 P.2d 473, 475-76 (1961). The court nevertheless reversed the
judgment of the trial court because plaintiffs had not alleged or presented any
(Continued on next page)
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Obviously, this judicial attitude toward "accommodation"
directors lessens the desirability of using such persons as a means
of satisfying the statutory requirement pertaining to the minimum
number of directors.70 In 1961, Delaware amended its general
corporation statute so as to provide that where all the shares of
a corporation are owned by less than three persons, the number

of directors may be less than three but not less than the number
of shareholders.7 7 A similar provision has been included in the

newly enacted statutes of Nebraska,7 8 New York, 9 and South
Carolina,8 and has been added to the Illinois Business Corporation Act by a 1963 amendment to that act.s - In the same year
as the Delaware amendment, the new Iowa Business Corporation

Act was amended to make it clear that the board of directors may
consist of "one or more" persons.8" A 1964 amendment to the
Kentucky corporation statute permits a Kentucky corporation to

be organized with a board composed of only one member. This
new provision, similar to the one in Iowa, is somewhat broader
in scope than the Delaware statute in that any corporation regard-

less of the number of shareholders can have a one-man board.83
2. Election or appointment of officers
In the closely held corporation, one of the most critical aspects
of control is likely to be that concerned with the election or
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

evidence as to the corporation's negligence or as to the amount of damages
sustained by plaintiffs, issues which the court felt defendant had a right to
relitigate since defendant had not been a party to the original suit against the
corporation.
76 Justice Schauer disagreed with that part of the majority opinion in the
Minton case which had treated as immaterial whether defendant had accepted
the office of director as an "accommodation." He said that he dissented from
any implication that "mere professional activity by an attorney at law, as such, in
the organization of a corporation, can constitute any basis for a finding that
the corporation is the attorney's alter ego or that he is otherwise personally liable
for its
77debts, whether based on contract or tort." 364 P.2d 473, 477 (1961).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141 (Supp. 1962).
784
P-H Corp. Serv., Neb. 32 (1968).
7
9N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702.
80 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-18.3 (Supp. 1962).
813
82 P-H Corp. Serv., I/. 51 (1963).
Iowa Code Ann. § 496A.34 (Supp. 1961).
83 H.B. 164, Ky. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 3 (1964). This change in
the Kentucky statute may call for an amendment to the provision dealing
with the minimum quorum for a meeting of the board of directors which
states that the quorum shall not be "less than one-third of the total number
of directors nor less than two directors." KRS 271.345(4) (c). The prefatory clause at the beginning of paragraph (4) of this section which states
"except as otherwise provided in the articles or bylaws" does not seem strong
(Continued on next page)
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appointment of the officers of the corporation since the members
frequently expect to receive regular remuneration in the form of
salaries by serving the corporation as officers. 84 Even if the
members do not serve in such capacities, they may still wish to
retain for themselves the power to elect or appoint the officers.
However, exercise of this power, at least as related to the important corporate offices, is normally treated in corporation
statutes as a function of the board of directors. 85 As a means of
relaxing the statutory requirement that officers be elected by the
board of directors, the New York Business Corporation Law
authorizes the inclusion of a provision in the articles of incorporation providing for the election of officers by the shareholders
rather than by the directors.8" A similar provision appears in the
corporation statutes of several other states.8 The inclusion of
such a provision in the Kentucky statute would seem appropriate
as a concession to the special needs of the participating shareholders in a close corporation.88
As a further concession to the realities of the one-man company, Kentucky should perhaps consider whether to retain the
present requirement which prevents the office of president from
being combined with any other of the statutory offices. 89 In the
preparation of the new Iowa Business Corporation Act, the Model
Act provision 0 that one man cannot be both president and secretary was discarded in favor of the existing Iowa rule allowing
one man to hold all the offices. 91 However, as a practical matter,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

enough to offset the mandatory language requiring a minimum of two directors
and thus would leave the sole incorporator of the one-man company with the
need for a two-man board.
84 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice § 179 (1959).
85
See note 35 supra.
88

N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(b).
See I Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice § 179, n. 94 (1959).
To protect against the possible removal of such officers by the board of
directors, both the New York and South Carolina statutes contain special provisions pertaining to removal of officers elected by the shareholders. In New York,
such officers may be suspended by the board for cause but may be removed only
by the shareholders. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716(a). Likewise, in South
Carolina, such officers may be removed only by the vote of the shareholders,
unless the shareholders have given the power of removal to the directos.
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-18.14(b) (Supp. 1962).
89 See KRS 271.355(1), which states that "any two of the offices of vicepresident,
secretary
and treasurer may be combined in one person."
90 Model
Bus. Corp.
Act § 44 (1959).
91 Cosson, The Iowa Business Corporation Act, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 12, 24
(1959).
87
88
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the need for use of two officers remains a necessity under most
corporation statutes even in the case of the one-man company
due to the presence of a requirement in these statutes that formal
corporate documents be executed by two officers, typically by
the president and by the secretary. In recognition of such long
established practice, the requirement that a corporation have at
least two officers was retained in the drafting of the recent
Wyoming Business Corporation Act,92 despite the fact that
Wyoming is now one of the states recognizing the single incorporator. 3 South Carolina hedged somewhat in its treatment
of this problem by providing that "any two or more offices may
be held by the same person, but no officer may act in more than
one capacity where action by two or more officers is required."9 4
The 1964 Kentucky General Assembly amended the section
on corporate officers in the Kentucky corporation statute so as to
remove the requirement that "the board of directors shall elect a
president, a secretary and a treasurer, and may elect one or more
vice-presidents." In its place a new provision has been inserted
which reads: "Such officers and agents as may be necessary for
the business of the corporation may be appointed by the board
of directors or in the manner provided in the bylaws."95 This
new provision would appear to contemplate the possibility of one
officer. The provisions in the present statute that "no officer need
be a director" and that "any two of the offices of vice-president,
secretary and treasurer may be combined in one person" have
been retained. Since it appears that the office of president still
cannot be combined with any of the other corporate offices mentioned in the statute, it may be that further steps need to be
taken to make it clear that any statutory requiremens as to the
execution of formal documents by two officers could be satisfied
by the execution of these documents by one person serving in
both capacities.
8. Shareholder voting agreements
Shareholders in a closely held corporation sometimes seek to
pool their voting strength through agreements among themselves
92

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-86.42 (Supp. 1962).

Rudolph, The New Wyoming Business CorporationAct, 15 Wyo. L.J. 185,
190 (1961).
94 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-18.18(e) (Supp. 1962).
95 H.B. 164, Ky. General Assemb ly, Reg. Sess. § 4 (1964).
93
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to vote their respective stock interests as a unit. Although such
shareholder pooling agreements are today generally upheld as
valid if made for proper purposes,96 provisions in several of the
recent statutory revisions recognize the inherent validity of such
agreements 97 and provide a legislative foundation in those jurisdictions for their enforceability."
As an indication of this new legislative development, reference may be had to a 1961 amendment to the Texas Business
Corporation Act which added to that act a section on voting
agreements. 9 This new section restricts such agreements to ten
years, requires a counterpart of the agreement to be deposited
with the corporation, and requires a statement on each certificate
representing shares held by parties to the agreement that the
shares are subject to such an agreement. The section then adds
that "upon such deposit of the counterpart of the agreement and
endorsement of the prescribed statement upon the certificates
representing shares, the agreement shall be specifically enforceable in accordance with the principles of equity."1'0
A less restrictive provision is that contained in the New York
Business Corporation Law which states broadly that an agreement
between two or more shareholders may provide that "the shares
held by them shall be voted as therein provided, or as they may
agree, 101 or as determined in accordance with a procedure agreed
upon by them."02 There is, however, no statement concerning
enforceability such as that contained in the Texas provision. The
provision on voting agreements in the South Carolina statute,
which is similar in wording to the New York provision, goes on
to provide that "such agreement shall be valid and enforceable
as between the parties thereto, for a period not to exceed ten
years from the date of its execution." °3 This language, which
96 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 5.08 (1958).
97 See Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), for an
example of judicial opposition to such agreements.
98 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Baily Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling,
29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), for an example of judicial reluctance99to grant specific performance of such agreements.
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.30-B (Vernon Supp. 1962).
100
Ibid.
0
1 1 It has been suggested that this particular clause may run into trouble
because of the judicial reluctance to enforce an agreement to agree." See
Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporationin New York Under Its New
Business CorporationLaw, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1961).
102 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(a).
103 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.15 (Supp. 1962).
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also appears in the North Carolina statute, 0 4 apparently would

preclude enforcement of the agreement against the corporation
if votes were cast by a record owner contrary to the agreement." 5
Despite this possible limitation on enforceability contained in

the North Carolina and South Carolina statutory provisions, these
provisions, like those in New York and Texas, carry legislative
assurance that shareholder voting agreements are a legitimate

form of shareholder activity.
In view of the fact that the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the

Haldeman case' 0 6 cast doubt on both the validity and enforce-

ability of agreements among shareholders restricting their voting
freedom, 0 7 there is lacking in Kentucky a solid legal foundation
for these agreements. The addition of a provision to the Kentucky corporation statute recognizing the validity (and enforceability) of the shareholders' voting agreement would help to offset
any adverse effect which the opinion of the court in the Haldeman
case might continue to have on such agreements and would help

to 'legitimize" this form of shareholder activity in Kentucky.
4. Irrevocable proxies
One of the most effective means of implementing a share-

holders' voting agreement so as to make it self-executing is
through the use of irrevocable proxies whereby a designated

person or persons are empowered to vote the stock in accordance
with the terms of the agreement. However, the attractiveness
of this implementing technique has been lessened somewhat

under present law because of the uncertainty as to the require104 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-73(a) (repl. vol. 1960).

305 The North Carolina statute specifically states in § 55-73(a) that "nothing
herein shall impair the privilege of the corporation to treat the shareholders of
record as entitled to vote the shares standing in their names. . ."
However, if
the agreement involves all the shareholders, ten under § 55-73(b) it appears the
agreement would bind the corporation as well as the parties thereto. The
official comments to § 55-73 state: "Subsection (a) makes such an agreement
among less than all the shareholders binding on them but not on the corporation.
Subsection (b), in substance, makes such an agreement among all the shareholders binding on them and the corporation." 4 P-H Corp. Serv., N.C. 270
(1963). The provision on voting agreements in the new Connecticut Stock
Corporation Act follows a similar pattern by providing that a voting agreement
complying with the requirements of the statute is "valid, irrevocable and
specifically enforceable" as among the parties to the agreement. Conn. Gen. Stat.
338-339 (Rev. to 1962).
1o See note 68 supra.
107 See Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50 Ky. LJ. 125,
145-46 (1961).
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ments for treating proxies as irrevocable' 8 and the possibility
that the presence of such proxies in the agreement may result
in it being treated as an invalid voting trust. 09
The New York Business Corporation Law contains a specific
provision enumerating the situations in which proxies stated to be
irrevocable are entitled to be so treated."" One of the enumerated
situations is when the proxy is held by a person designated by or
under a shareholders' voting agreement."' The new South Carolina statute follows New York law in this respect. 2 Thus in
ment may use proxy provisions with assurance that on the one
hand they will accomplish the result intended by making the
agreement binding and on the other hand will not destroy the
agreement by moving it into the field reserved for the voting
trust.
The Kentucky corporation statute states that "a proxy, unless
coupled with an interest, shall be revocable at will."113 However,
the word "interest" as used in this statutory language remains
undefined either in the statute or by judicial decision. The
"interest" thereby referred to is open to interpretation as consisting of anything from an interest in the shares of stock themselves at one extreme 1 4 to an interest in the "subject matter upon
which the power is to be exercised" at the other extreme."5r
Since each shareholder under a shareholders' voting agreement
retains title to his shares of stock, the requisite interest necessary
to support an irrevocable proxy would be lacking under the first

possible interpretation and a draftsman, therefore, would have
no assurance that he could make effective use of proxy provisions
as a means of implementing such an agreement. A revamping of
108

See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 5.36 (1958).

109 See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1957), in

which the Supreme Court of Delaware invalidated a shareholders' voting agreement on the broad ground that the agreement was so drawn as to occupy the
field reserved for the statutory voting trust.
11o N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(f).
Ill N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(f)(5).
112 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.14(f)(Supp. 1962).
Under both statutes the
proxy becomes revocable by a purchaser of the shares without knowledge unless
notice of the proxy and its irrevocability appears plainly on the stock certificates.
See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(h); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.14(h) (Supp. 1962).

these two states the draftsman of a shareholders' voting agree113 KRS 271.315(3).
114 See, e.g., In re Chilson, 19 Del. Ch. 398, 168 AtI. 82 (Ch. 1933).

"15 State ex rel. Everett Trust & Say. Bank v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22
Wash.2d 844, 157 P.2d 707, 710 (1945).
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the proxy provisions of the Kentucky statute so as to spell out
with greater particularity the instances in which a proxy may be
considered as irrevocable would undoubtedly strengthen the usefulness of the proxy as a control device in Kentucky.
If such a revamping of the proxy provisions were to be undertaken, it may be doubted whether the enumeration of instances
in which a proxy is to be considered irrevocable should be made
exclusive, as in New York, since this would have the undesirable
effect of precluding judicial development in Kentucky of the concept of a "proxy coupled with an interest." Judicial development
of this concept may be needed as a means of meeting new corporate situations where treatment of a proxy as irrevocable becomes
necessary as a means of protecting the interests of the proxy
6
holder."1
Flexibility in the statutory concept of the irrevocable proxy
could be obtained by use of a general statutory provision establishing the basic concept of irrevocability followed by a specific
enumeration of the particular situations thought to be deserving
of special mention as coming within this basic concept. Such an
approach has been used in the section on irrevocable proxies
contained in the new Connecticut Stock Corporation Act." 7
Subsection (a) of this section provides that a duly executed proxy
is to be treated as irrevocable if it specifies that it is irrevocable
and if "it is coupled with an interest sufficient in law to support
an irrevocable power coupled therewith." Subsection (b) then
goes on to provide that "without limiting the generality of subsection (a) of this section and subject thereto, a proxy is coupled
with an interest and irrevocable if it is held by any of" certain
designated classes of persons (or their nominees) enumerated in
the subsection. These classes of persons include (1) a pledgee,
(2) a purchaser under an executory contract of sale, (8) a creditor
(or creditors) extending credit to the corporation in consideration
of the proxy, and (4) a person performing personal services for
the corporation under a contract of employment calling for such
a proxy. This list of persons parallels the enumeration contained
in the New York statute, except for the addition to the list in
116 See Hetherington, Trends in Legislation for Close Corporations: A Comparison of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law of 1951 and the New York
Business CorporationLaw of 1961, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 92, 102.
117 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-337 (Rev. to 1962).
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New York of those persons holding proxies under a shareholders'
voting agreement. Specific enumeration of this latter category of
persons would seem particularly desirable in view of the significance which the irrevocability of proxies may have to such persons under a voting agreement.
5. Voting trusts

Another control device available to the participating shareholders in a close corporation is the voting trust. Under this
arrangement shareholders in a corporation execute an agreement
transferring their shares to a voting trustee (or trustees) for the
purpose of conferring on the trustee (or trustees) the right to
vote the shares."" Modem corporation statutes customarily contain a section recognizing the validity of such voting trust agreements and regulating to some extent the structure and operation
of the trust."9 The Kentucky general corporation statute contains
such a section. 20 While this section compares favorably with
voting trust provisions in the corporation statutes of other jurisdictions, some further "modernization" of the section appears
possible in the light of recent statutory developments.
The Kentucky provision, for example, states that "any other
shareholder may transfer his shares to the same trustee upon the
terms and conditions stated in said agreement, and thereupon
shall be bound by all of the provisions of said agreement."'1 21 The

privilege thus granted to "outsiders" to join the trust has a
potentially adverse effect on the effectiveness of the trust as a
control device if the terms of the trust permit the depositors to
instruct the trustees in their voting of the stock. 22 It provides
a means whereby such "outsiders" could nullify the desires of the
original "inside" group, if such "outsiders" owned enough stock to
outvote the "insiders." It is significant that a similar privilege
granted in the former New York Stock Corporation Law12 3 has
been omitted from the voting trust provisions in the new Business
118

See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 5.31 (1958).

19 See Watkins, The Development of Voting Trust Legislation, 35 U. Det.

L.J. 595
2 (1958).
3 0 KRS 271.825.
121 KRS 271.325(3).
122 There is legal sanction for such terms under the Kentucky statute which
refers to the vesting of voting rights in the trustee "upon the terms and conditions
stated in the agreement." KRS 271.325(1).
123 N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 50.
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Corporation Law of that state,'1 24 thereby removing what has been
said to have been in New York "an obstacle to the utilization of
the voting trust device."' 2 5
One of the by-products resulting from the creation of a voting
trust is the change in the relationship which may occur between
the depositors of such a trust and the corporation. Technically,
the depositors are no longer shareholders in the corporation after
transfer of their stock on the corporate books to the trustees,
and, as a consequence, they may be deprived of rights which are
given to shareholders by corporation statutes.' 2 There is, for
example, the right of shareholders to inspect the books and
records of the corporation' 27 and their right to vote on fundamental corporate changes such as merger or consolidation, 28 sale
of assets, 20 amendment of the articles of incorporation,"' and
voluntary dissolution.' 3' Since these rights generally have no
relationship to the reasons prompting the creation of the voting
trust, there would ordinarily seem to be, as the late Professor
Ballantine once said, "no justification for such a complete stripping of the shareholder of all the safeguards provided by law for
his protection.' 32 The draftsmen of the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act met this problem by providing that trust
certificate holders are to have a direct right to vote on fundamental corporate changes 133 and by providing that such certificate
holders are to be treated as shareholders with respect to the right
to inspect corporate books and records. 3 ' The new South Carolina statute, which also permits trust certificate holders to
exercise certain rights possessed by shareholders, provides that,
as to fundamental corporate changes, the trustees retain the right
to vote unless the voting trust agreement otherwise provides.' 3
Nevertheless, these two states appear to have taken the lead in
124 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 621.
125 Kessler, The New York Business CorporationLaw, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1,
19 n. 277
(1961).
6

1 See Ballantine, Corporations § 184b (rev. ed. 1946).
127 KRS 271.395(4).

128 KRS 271.470.
129 KRS 271.415(2).
130 KRS 271.445(2).
131 KRS 271.500.
132 Ballantine, Corporations § 184b (rev. ed. 1946).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-72(c) (repl. vol. 1960).
134 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-72(b) (repl. vol. 1960).
'33

135 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.16(g) (Supp. 1962).
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softening the impact of the voting trust on the relationship of the
shareholder-depositor to his corporation. 136
The South Carolina voting trust statute contains a provision
which would make a worthwhile addition to other voting trust
statutes, including the Kentucky statute. It is a provision stating
that a voting trust agreement created for a period in excess of
the ten-year period prescribed by the statute is not to be treated
as adversely affected during a period of ten years from the date
of its creation but is merely to be considered as inoperative after
the expiration of the ten-year period. 37 The addition of such a
provision to the Kentucky statute would obviate the necessity
for a judicial interpretation by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
as to the legal effect of a voting trust created for a period in
excess of that prescribed by the statute, a matter of considerable
practical importance since courts in other jurisdictions have held
invalid voting trusts whose duration exceeded or could have
38
exceeded the prescribed statutory period.1
6. Transactions with interesteddirectors
In the area of director action, a development which has been
occurring with increasing frequency in the revisions of corporation codes relates to the addition of statutory provisions dealing
with transactions between corporations and their directors or
officers.
While transactions involving interested directors are by no
means peculiar to the close corporation, 39 this type of corporation
provides a fertile opportunity for such transactions due to the
typical close identity between directors and officers and the likeli136 The Indiana voting trust statute provides for inspection of books and
records by voting trust certificate holders. Ind. Stat. Ann.§ 25-256 (Burns repl.
vol. 1960). In Florida, the section of the corporation statute entitled "voting
trusts" provides that the trustee shall have no right to vote the stock for the

purpose of either increasing or decreasing the capital stock unless the agreement

expressly gives him such right. However, the "voting trust" there provided for
resembles closely the shareholders' voting agreement since the statute provides
that the trustees "shall not acquire the legal title to the stock but shall be vested
only with the legal right and title to the voting power which is incident to the
ownership of the stock." Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 608.43
(1956).
1962).
(Supp.
137 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.16(f)
138 Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 83, 191 At. 823 (Ch.

1937); Christopher v. Richardson, 394 Pa. 425, 147 A.2d 375
139 See, e.g., the emphasis placed on the existence of a
by the Supreme Court of Delaware in upholding the validity
plan of American Airlines, Inc. in Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d
1960).

(1959).
disinterested board
of the stock option
731 (Del. Sup. Ct.
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hood that the directors will find it necessary or expedient to

approve matters pertaining to their capacities as officers, such as,
for example, their claim to compensation for serving in an executive capacity. The dual position in which directors may thus find
themselves poses a serious problem of fiduciary responsibility.

Under the prevailing rule at common law, any transaction involving an interested director is treated as voidable if his presence is
necessary to make a quorum or his vote is necessary to secure
approval of the transaction, irrespective of the fairness of the

transaction. 140 Recent corporate statutory revisions have followed the lead of California141 in removing the taint of adverse
interest if the transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation. 4 - This legislative adoption of the "liberal" rule as to
directors' contracts places the emphasis where it has been said

rightfully to belong, that is, on the nature and effects of the
transaction, rather
than on the mere presence of the adverse
43
1
interest itself.

In addition to including general provisions on transactions
with interested directors similar to those in California, the section
on interested directors in the New York Business Corporation
Law contains a paragraph specifically related to the compensation of directors. This paragraph states that "unless otherwise
provided in the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws, the
board shall have authority to fix the compensation of directors
for services in any capacity." 44 This particular provision has been
criticized as involving "a significant relaxation of the fiduciary
duty of corporate directors" because it is "absolutely unqualified
except for the right of the certificate or by-laws to forbid such
self-dealing."' 45 A comparable provision which would appear to
meet this objection is one adopted in Wisconsin as a result of a
140

Ballantine, Corporations § 68 (rev. ed. 1946).

141 Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 820 (Deering 1962).
142 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-328 (Rev. to 1962); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 713; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-30; S.C. Code Ann. § 12-18.16 (Supp. 1962).
143 Stevens, Corporations § 148, at 683 (2d ed. 1949).
144N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(c).
145 Kessler, The New York Business CorporationLaw, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1,
77 (1961). Compare Hoffman, The Status of Shareholders and Directors Under
New York's Business Corporation Law: A Comparative View, 11 Buffalo L. Rev.
496, 569 (1962), wherein the author says that "the legislature in enacting paragraph (c) has given evidence of its faith in the essential integrity of the average
board, and of its understanding that competition for talented managers is so keen
in the current corporate market that boards of domestic corporations must have
the necessary flexibility to compete successfully."
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judicial decision in that state invalidating a directors' resolution
fixing executive compensation on the ground of self-interest. 4 '
The Wisconsin enactment provides that the board of directors
shall have authority to establish reasonable compensation for the
directors for services rendered by them as directors, officers or
otherwise unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws otherwise
provide. 1 47 Similar legislation has been enacted in Illinois 148 and
49
Ohio.1

In 1953, a provision was added to the Model Business Corporation Act which authorizes the board of directors to fix the
compensation of directors. 1 0 However, this provision seems open
to the same objection as the New York provision since the
authority granted to fix compensation is not qualified by any
requirement of reasonableness. Utah, which adopted a new Business Corporation Act in 1961 based on the Model Act, has added
a sentence to the Model Act provision on director compensation
which states that "such compensation so fixed, shall be reported
to the shareholders, except in the case of a corporation subject to
proxy rules issued by the Federal Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Act of 1934."' 5' The thought
behind such a reporting requirement appears to be that through
publicity of the amount of compensation voted by directors to
themselves there is an opportunity for shareholders to keep themselves informed as to executive compensation and to take appropriate action if such compensation becomes excessive.
7. Informal board action
Informal action by the board of directors of a close corporation is likely to present as much (or more) of a problem than
that concerned with informal action by the shareholders in such
a corporation. Yet, as previously mentioned, Kentucky by statute
1 52
provides only for informal action at the shareholder level.
Provision is made for such informal action if all the shareholders
who would have been entitled to vote upon the action to be
' 4 6 Stoiber v. Miller Brewing Co., 257 Wis. 13, 42 N.W.2d 144 (1950).
147Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.31 (1957).

148Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 32, § 157.33 (Sminth-Hurd perm ed. Supp. 1962).
149 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.60 (Page Supp. 1962).
150 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 33 (1959).
151 Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-33 (repl. vol. 1962).
152 KRS 271.405.
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taken give their consent to such action in writing.'5 3 A similar
approach is used in the Model Business Corpoartion Act 5 and

has likewise been followed in the drafting of the New York
Business Corporation Law.'5 5 Indeed, in New York the importance of the requirement that directors act collectively rather
than individually has been underscored by a specific provision
in the new law which states that "any reference.., to corporate
action to be taken by the board shall mean such action at a

meeting of the board." 56
This statutory requirement that the board of directors act
"at a meeting" has evoked the observation that it "protects the
deliberative function of the board, at the expense of what may
be considerable inconvenience in close corporations."' 5 7 It is
significant, therefore, that today in almost one-half the states,
steps have been taken to authorize informal action by directors
as well as by shareholders. 55 The usual requirement is that the
directors have given their unanimous consent in writing. 50 In
some instances these provisions appear as departures from the
Model Act;'-6 in other instances, the provisions appear as amendments to existing statutes.' 6 ' In any event, the frequent appearance of these provisions in recent years attests to a growing
153 Exceptions from this broad authorization include (1) voluntary transfer
of assets, and (2) merger or consolidation. See KRS 271.405.
'54 See 2 Model Bus. Co . Act Ann. § 138, fl 4 (1960).
155 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 615.
156 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 708.
15 7 Hetherington, Trends in Legislation for Close Corporations:A Comparison
of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law of 1951 and the New York Business
CorporationLaw of 1961, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 92, 110.
358 See 1 P-H Corp. Serv., Rep. Bull. No. 20, March 27, 1963, ff 20.8.
159 The North Carolina statute recognizes informal board action not only
where all the directors have given their consent in writing but also where all the
shareholders know of the action and make no prompt objection to it or where
the directors with the knowledge of the shareholders are accustomed to take
informal action and no director makes prompt objection to the action. N.C. Gen.
Stat. II 55-29 (repl. vol. 1960). The South Carolina statutory provision on
informal action by directors, as amended by the 1963 legislature, follows a similar
pattern. See 5 P-H Corp. Serv., S.C. 168 (1963). See also the new Connecticut
Stock Corporation Act which appears to sanction informal action by less than all
the directors if the number of directors giving their consent in writing constitutes a quorum for such action. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-316(d) (Rev. to 1962).
160 See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 496A.140 (1962); Miss. Code Ann. § 5309-303
(recompiled vol. Supp. 1962); Ore Rev. Stat. § 57-791 (repl. part 1961); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 180.91 (1957); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-36.121 (Supp. 1961).
161 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 814.5 (Deering 1962) (added in 1961);
Del. Code Ann. § 141(g) (Supp. 1962) (added in 1957); Idaho Code § 30-139(5)
(Supp. 1963) (effective July 1,1963); Ill.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 32, § 147.1 (SmithHurd perm. ed. Supp. 1962) (added in 1961); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 25-208 (Burns
Repl. vol. 1960 (added in 1959).
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recognition that a board of directors may find it expedient 1or
62
necessary to act informally, especially in the close corporation.
The time would appear to have come for Kentucky to "modernize"
its statute by joining the growing list of states recognizing this
privilege of informal director action.
DISSOLUTION

1. Deadlock statutes-In general
No aspect of the close corporation has perhaps given rise to
as much concern as that relating to dissolution of the corporation
when dissension and deadlock occur among its members. Courts
of equity early adopted the position that there was no inherent
163
equitable jurisdiction to decree the dissolution of a corporation,
and this is sometimes still asserted as a general principle of
corporation law. 6 ' However, certain well-recognized exceptions

to this principle have developed where the purposes of the corporation are no longer possible of attainment

65

or where there has

been fraud or mismanagement on the part of those in control of
the corporate affairs. 66
Speaking of the increased frequency with which courts of
equity have been called upon to exercise their traditional powers

to correct abuses in corporate management, including dissolution
of the corporation itself, the Michigan Supreme Court made the

pertinent observation that "there is a noticeable trend, in cases
decided since the turn of the century, toward recognizing the
inherent power of a court of equity to grant relief in proper

cases."1 6

Despite this relaxation in the judicial attitude toward

62
1
It is interesting to note that Michigan has placed itself in the anomolous
position of providing for informal action by directors but not by shareholders.
See Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.13(c) (Supp. 1961).
163 See 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice § 816 (1959). In Oldham
v. Mt. Sterling Improvement Co., 103 Ky. 529, 532, 45 S.W. 779, 780 (1898), the
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in denying a request for dissolution on the part
of a subscriber to the capital stock of a corporation, said that "courts of equity
have, in the absence of statutory power, no jurisdiction over corporations for the
purpose of decreeing their dissolution."
164 16A Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 8098 (perm. ed. rev. voL 1962);
Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1260 (1950).
165 16A Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 8081 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1962).
166
Id. § 8082.
167 Levant v. Kowal, 350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336, 340 (1957). In Oscar
C. Wright Co. v. Steenman, 254 Ky. 381, 389, 71 S.W.2d 991, 995 (1934), the
Kentucky Court of Appeals made the statement that "a court of equity has
inherent jurisdiction at the instance of stockholders (or creditors) where the

(Continued on next page)
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equitable relief for the "distressed" corporation, there remains a
strong judicial reluctance to grant a decree of dissolution to a
prosperous corporation merely on the ground of internal strife,
dissension, and deadlock." 8 Yet, as Professor Lattin has observed,
"in the absence of a statute authorizing dissolution when there is
a deadlock of the board or of the shareholders, approach through
equity seems particularly desirable, for it is rare in such a case
to find less than serious consequences if the deadlock continues.'

168

Deadlock statutes are rapidly becoming a standard feature of
modem corporation codes. However, it is an open question
whether many of these statutes will accomplish anything more
than to put at rest whatever continued reluctance courts might
otherwise have had to entertain petitions for receivership and
dissolution of deadlocked corporations. 70 Recent decisions have
made it clear that even under these statutes a disgruntled faction
in a corporation cannot necessarily expect to secure from a court
an order decreeing dissolution (or liquidation) of the corporation
based on the existence of dissension and deadlock among the
members unless the court is otherwise convinced that the equities
171
of the case warrant resort to this drastic form of equitable relief.
Furthermore, the deadlock statutes themselves frequently make
relief dependent upon a showing that deadlock has resulted in
"irreparable injury to the corporation " 1 72 or upon a showing that
dissolution would be "beneficial to the shareholders." 73 To the
extent that relief is thus qualified, an individual shareholder in a
close corporation faced with the spectre of irreconcilable dissension with his associates may ind himself at the mercy of the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

facts call for the exercise of its jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of either a
solvent or insolvent corporation 'on the ground of fraud, gross mismanagement
or dissension among the stockholders, directors or officers, if there is no other
adequate remedy.'
168 See, e.g., Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. 522, 105 S.W.2d 625 (1937).
169 Lattin, Corporations 557 (1959).
170 See 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice § 789, at 838, wherein the
author says that in his opinion "the deadlock statutes neither enlarge upon nor
cut down the inherent power of equity to dissolve or wind up a corporation."
'71 See, e.g., Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348 P.2d 9
(1959).
172 See, e.g., Ala. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 21(78) (a) (1) (recom piled vol. 1958,
supp. 1961); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 25-242(a) (6) (Burns repi. vol. 1960 ); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 2852-1107 A. (4) (Purdon penn. ed. 1958).
'73 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 4651(d) (Deering 1962); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 81.49(4) (1947).
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faction whose members happen at the time to hold the key
executive positions in the corporation.
Kentucky enacted a deadlock statute in 1952.14 The statute
reads:
A corporation may be dissolved by the decree of the
circuit court of the county in which the registered office of the
corporation is situated when it is made to appear that the
corporation has an even number of directors who are equally
divided respecting the management of its affairs, and that the
voting shares of such corporation are equally divided into two
independent ownerships or interests, and one-half thereof is
owned or controlled by persons favoring the course of views
of part of the directors and one-half is owned or controlled
by persons favoring the course or views of other directors, or
that the persons owning or controlling the voting shares are
unable to agree on, or vote for, the election of a board of
directors consisting of an uneven number ....
175
It will be observed that this statutory provision contains no
special language qualifying the scope of the power thereby
granted to the circuit court. 7 ' However, the language used is
that a corporation may be dissolved by court decree. It does
not say that the court must grant such a decree when deadlock
exists. Similar language under the Delaware deadlock statute
has been held to be permissive rather than mandatory.177 If this
interpretation should be adopted in Kentucky, then a court could
still refuse dissolution to a solvent corporation despite the
existence of deadlock.
The emphasis which courts have given to the economic condition of a corporation in cases involving corporate deadlock was
underscored a few years ago in the leading New York case of
In re Radom & Neidoif, Inc.178 In that case a majority of the
New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Desmond,
denied as a matter of law a petition for dissolution of a profitable
corporation under the New York deadlock statute despite allegations of serious and irreconcilable deadlock between the two
174 Ky. Acts 1952, ch. 116.
175 KRS 271.570(2).

176 Ibid. The statute goes on to state that "in any such case suit for the
appointment of a receiver... shall be brought by the holders of shares entitling
them to7 exercise one-half or more of the voting power of the corporation."
17 Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Inc., 143 A.2d 272 (Del. Ch. 1958).
178307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
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fifty per cent owners. The statute provided that, if, after hearing,
it should appear that a dissolution would be "beneficial to the
stockholders... and not injurious to the public," the court must
make a final order dissolving the corporation. 1 79 Judge Desmond,
referring to the continued prosperity of the corporation, failed to
find in the petitioner's allegations of management deadlock the
necessary "benefit" to shareholders required by the statute.
As a matter of substantive law, Judge Fuld made it clear in
his dissenting opinion that he did not equate "benefit" to purely
monetary considerations. "The sole issue," he said, "is whether
there is a deadlock as to the management of the corporation, not
whether business is being conducted at a profit or loss." s°
Further, he argued, "it would certainly be 'beneficial' to dissolve
the corporation if the court were to find that there is a continuing, irreparable stalemate in the corporate management, for
8
which petitioner is not primarily at fault."' '
The new Business Corporation Law of New York attempts to
overcome the effects of the Radom decision by providing that in
the case of a petition based on deadlock among directors or
shareholders "dissolution is not to be denied merely because it is
found that the corporate business has been or could be conducted
at a profit."8 2 Dissolution, however, still remains discretionary
with the court. The new deadlock section provides that fifty per
cent of the shareholders entitled to vote in an election of directors
may petition for dissolution on one or more of the following
grounds:
(1) That the directors are so divided respecting the management of the corporation's affairs that the votes required
for action by the board cannot be obtained.
(2) That the shareholders are so divided that the votes
required for the election of directors cannot be obtained.
(3) That there is internal dissension and two or more
factions of shareholders are so divided
that dissolution would
183
be beneficial to the shareholders.
179 From a procedural standpoint Judge Fuld, dissenting in the Radom case,
took the position that once the court had entertained an application for dissolution
based on deadlock, it was mandatory for a hearing to take place and that the
court was powerless to order a dismissal until the facts had been heard and the
issues decided. 119 N.E.2d 563, 565-66.
180 119 N.E.2d 563, 568 (1954).
181 Id. at 569.
182 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1111(b) (3).
183 N.Y. Bus. Corp, Law § 1104(a).
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A comment to this section states that "the purpose of subparagraph (a) (3) is to make clear that dissension between
factions of shareholders, particularly in small corporations, which
makes continued association unworkable and the continuance of
the corporate business no longer advantageous to the share18 4
holders, is also a reasonable ground for dissolution."
In addition to providing for petition by fifty per cent of the
shareholders, the new deadlock statute in New York provides
that
any holder of shares entitled to vote at an election of directors
of a corporation, may present a petition for its dissolution on
the ground that the shareholders are so divided that they have
failed, for a period which includes at least two consecutive
annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose
terms have expired or would have expired upon the election
and qualification of their successors. 18 5
Provisions similar to this permitting petitions for involuntary
dissolution (or liquidation) to be filed by a single shareholder
appear in the statutes of a number of other states, particularly
those that have used the Model Business Corporation Act as a
basis for corporate law revisions. The pertinent portions of the
Model Act provision state that courts shall have full power to
liquidate the assets and business of a corporation:
(a) In an action by a shareholders when it is established:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management
of the corporate affairs and the shareholders are unable to
break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof; or
(3) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power,
and have failed, for a period which includes at least two
consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the
election of their successors .... 186
A question which has arisen under paragraph (a) (3) of the
Model Act provision is whether a court must order liquidation if
the factual deadlock described in the paragraph exists or whether
184 Revision Note, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104.
185 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104(c).
186 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 90 (1959).
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the court has discretion to refuse such an order despite the
existence of a deadlock.
A persuasive argument can be made that dissolution should

be automatic if the deadlock described by paragraph (a)(8)
exists, particularly since no qualifying words appear in this paragraph such as appear in paragraph (a) (1) which requires that
there be a showing that "irreparable injury to the corporation
187
is being suffered or is threatened by reason" of the deadlock.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court 188 adopted this reasoning with
reference to such a provision added to the Wisconsin deadlock

statute by amendment in 1953.189 Argument had been made that
an order of forced liquidation should depend upon a showing
that liquidation would be beneficial to the shareholders. After
pointing to the make-up of the Illinois deadlock statute,19 0 which
omits any qualifying language in a similar paragraph devoted to

shareholder deadlock, and after commenting that the committee
which had sponsored the Wisconsin amendment must be assumed
to have been familiar with qualifying language which appears in

the deadlock statutes of other states, the court concluded that
187 The comparable paragraph in the new South Carolina Business Corporation Act to paragraph (a (1) of the Model Act provides for a decree of involuntary dissolution upon a showing either that the corporation will suffer irreparable
injury or that "the business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be
conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally." S.C. Code Ann. §
12-22.15 (a)(1)(Supp. 1962). A South Carolina writer has commented that
"the desirability of a looser alternative test is shown by extreme judicial reluctance
to dissolve a hopelessly deadlocked corporation which may still be able to drift
along at some profit, although the shareholders are at each other's throats."
Folk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law Revision, 18 Bus.
Law. 351, 391 (1963). To ward off the judicial tendency to emphasize profits,
the South Carolina Act adds a provision, similar to the one in New York, that
"in determining whether dissolution shall be ordered on petition of a shareholder
under subsection (a), dissolution shall not be denied solely because it is found
that the business of the corporation has been or could be conducted at a profit."
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-22.15(f)(Supp. 1962). North Carolina has completely
discarded the language of "irreparable injury" in the paragraph of its state
concerned with director deadlock and has demanded only a s owing that "the
business can no longer be conducted to the advantage of all the shareholders."
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(a)(1)(repl. vol. 1960). On the other hand, Virginia,
a Model Act state, has retained the language of "irreparable injury" not only in
the paragraph on director deadlock but also in the paragraph on shareholder
deadlock. The latter paragraph provides for a decree of involuntary dissolution
wvhen it is established that "as shown by the proceedings at any meeting of the
stockholders the stockholders are deadlocked in voting power and that irreparable
injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof."
Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-94(a) (3) (repl. vol. 1956).
188 Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389
(1956).
189 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.771(1)(a)(1957).
190Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 32, § 157.86(a) (2) (Smith-Hurd perm. ed. 1954).
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whether or not a liquidation will be beneficial or detrimental to
the shareholders should not be treated as a material factor in
exercising the power of liquidation conferred by this paragraph
of the deadlock statute.' 91
Subsequently, however, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected
this conclusion with regard to an identical provision on shareholder deadlock which became a part of Oregon law as the result
of the adoption by that state of the Model Business Corporation
Act in 1953.192

The Oregon court was unimpressed with the

argument that because a showing of "irreparable injury to the
corporation" is a prerequisite to liquidation under the deadlocked
directorate provision, the absence of this requirement from the
shareholder deadlock provision precluded a consideration of
benefit or detriment to the stockholders, saying:
We do not understand the statute in this way. We can not
equate 'irreparable injury and 'benefit to the shareholders.'
The former is a much more restrictive idea. The absence of a
requirement of 'irreparable injury' from the jurisdictional facts
which must be proven in a petition for dissolution by reason
of shareholder deadlock certainly does not indicate that we
must dismiss from our consideration of the equities of the case
any showing of actual benefit to the stockholders from the
operation of the company. We think that it is only persuasive
of the fact that 'irreparable injury' is not properly a decisive
193
factor.
The Oregon court conceded that it would have been inclined
to agree with the Wisconsin court as to the immateriality of
"benefit" if "benefit" related to mere insolvency, but concluded
that it could not accept the Wisconsin viewpoint if "benefit"
were to be treated as also including actual benefits to the share94
holders in the form of such matters as payment of dividends.
The opinion of the Oregon court illustrates once again the
19177 N.W.2d 389, 395 (1956). As an alternative ground for its decision
reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the trial court
had abused its discretion in refusing to order liquidation since there was "no
alternative corrective remedy" other than dissolution in view of the fact that a
vacancy existed on the board of directors of the company and the company bylaws contained a provision prohibiting the board of directors from transacting any
business until such vacancy had been filled by the shareholders.
192 Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959).
193 Id. at 20.
194 Id. at 19.
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importance which the judiciary has tended to place on economic
factors in exercising its statutory power to decree dissolution in
cases of deadlock. If, as seems likely, the primary purpose of the
paragraph on shareholder deadlock which appears in both the
Oregon and Wisconsin corporation statutes is to protect the right
to participate in management, then it appears that the interpetration given to the paragraph by the Wisconsin court is more
nearly in conformity with its basic purpose.'9 5 However, as one
commentator has observed, "regardless of the purpose of existing
deadlock statutes, none suffices adequately to define and protect
the recommended right of participation." 96
Perhaps one of the clearest judicial recognitions of the importance of management participation is that contained in the
New Jersey case of Petition of Collins-Doan Co.,19r which arose
under a deadlock statute similar to the Kentucky statute. Dissolution under the New Jersey statute is authorized in the case
of a company which has an even number of directors who are
divided equally respecting the management of its affairs and
whose voting stock is similarly divided or whose voting share198
holders are unable to elect a directorate of an uneven number.
A deadlock situation such as described by the statute developed
whereby for a period of over ten years the management of the
business was assumed by a controlling member of one of the two
equally divided factions. In approving dissolution of the corporation under such circumstances as serving the interests of the
shareholders as well as public policy, the court said:
There is no corporate function here. The business is under
the management of one who happened to be serving in that
capacity when the deadlock occurred; and the direction has
become personalized to the exclusion of all other interests.
If the statute has no efficacy here, then it can have no practical
195 See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778, 786 (1952).
198 Tingle, The Stockholder's Remedy of Corporate Dissolution 195 (1959).

His recommendation would be for a specific statutory provision calling for
dissolution "when participation in the executive management of the corporate
business is denied to a plaintiff (or ]?laintiffs voting continuously as a unit)
owning a percentage of the corporation s stock sufficient to cause a stalemate in
an election of directors." Id. at 196.
1973 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949).
198 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:13-15 (Supp. 1962).
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utility or meaning. Such interposition is justifiable in the public interest where, as here, corporate action cannot be had. 199

Although recent decisions in other jurisdictions also reflect an
awareness by the courts in those jurisdictions of the importance
of management participation, 0 0 there remains the undercurrent
of judicial emphasis on economic factors in resolving petitions for
the dissolution and liquidation of deadlocked corporations. Therefore, a special statutory provision, such as in New York, specifically directing that dissolution is not to be denied merely
because the corporation is being operated at a profit seems useful
as a means of encouraging greater emphasis by courts on noneconomic factors in passing on the merits of such petitions.
Furthermore, a statutory provision of this nature is consistent
with the growing recognition that the relationship of shareholders
in a close corporation is analogous to that of partners in a partnership.

20 1

If an unincumbered "way-out" is provided the minority shareholder in the close corporation either by clear statutory mandate

or by shift in judicial emphasis, then it may well be that the
remaining shareholding interests should be given the alternative
privilege of buying out the minority interest as a means of
preserving going concern values. The merit of such buy-out
arrangements in situations involving corporate dissolution has

been recognized by the Kentucky Court of Appeals" 2 as well as
19970 A.2d 159, 165 (1949). In two states the statutory language carries
overtones of the "corporate function' referred to by the New Jersey court. See
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 15-1120 (repl. vol. 1955, supp. 1963) (corporate powers
have been materially impaired); S.D. Code § 37.2601 (5) (Supp. 1960) (corporation
unable to exercise its corporate function).
200 See, e.g., Krall v. Krall, 141 Conn. 825, 106 A.2d 165 (1954); Gidwitz
v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960); Handlan
v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W.2d 944 (1950).
201 See Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporation in New York
Under Its New Business Corporation Law, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 16 (1961),
wherein the author, in commenting on the majority opinion in the Radom case,
said:
If the analogy between the close corporation and the p2artnership be
no realistic
to the otherwisedissolution
kept in clear
problem
of the perspective-and
deadlocked corporation
wouldsolution
seem possible
the position of the majority in the Radom case seems excessively concerned with profit and loss as an essential ingredient of the "beneficial
to shareholders" standard and insufficiently concerned with the interof the
personalv.relationship
202 Graham
McAdoo, 135
Ky. "partners."
677, 684, 123 S.W. 260, 2.62-6 (1909).
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by courts in other states.20 3 Furthermore, several states have seen
fit to add such buy-out provisions to their corporation codes. 4
The new South Carolina Business Corporation Act contains a
section devoted to relief other than dissolution which provides
that, in an action filed by a shareholder to dissolve a corporation,
"the court may make such order or grant such relief, other than
dissolution, as in its discretion it deems appropriate." 5 This
relief may include an order providing for the purchase at their
fair value of shares of any shareholder by the corporation or by
other shareholders. In addition, such relief may also include an
order (1) cancelling or altering provisions contained in the
articles of incorporation or bylaws, or (2) cancelling, altering,
or enjoining resolutions or other acts of the corporation, or (3)
directing or prohibiting acts of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors, officers or other persons party to the action.2 0 6
2. Deadlock resultingfrom veto arrangements
By its terms the Kentucky deadlock statute appears to be
directed primarily at deadlock resulting from an equally divided
vote of directors or shareholders. However, deadlock may result
not only because of the presence of equally divided voting
factions in a corporation but also because of the presence in the
articles (or bylaws) of unanimous or high vote requirements for
shareholder or director action.20 1 New York made special pro203 See, e.g., Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219 Ore. 560, 348 P.2d 9, 22
(1959); Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389,
396-97 (1956).
204 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 4658 (Deering 1953); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 33-384 (Rev. to 1962); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 15-1124 (repl. vol. 1955, supp.
1963); W.Va. Code Ann. § 3093 (1961).
205 S.C. Code Ann. § 12-22.23(a) (Supp. 1962).
206 Two states, California and Missouri, make provision for the appointment
of a "provisional director" when a corporation has an even number ofdirectors
who are equally divided. See Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 819 (Deering 1962); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 351.323 (1959). However, while use of a provisional director may
have utility in cases of temporary stalemate, appointment of such a director is
not likely to provide a satisfactory substitute for dissolution in cases of serious
and extended deadlock. See Tingle, The Shareholders Remedy of Corporate
Dissolution 135 (1959).
207 The Kentucky corporation statute appears to contemplate charter (or by]awl. provisions requiring high vote or high quorum requirements for shareholder
or director action. See Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50
Ky. L.J. 125, 157-64 (1961). The only particular problem with such veto
arrangements would appear to be the technical one as to whether changes in
the quorum requirement for directors meetings may appear in either the articles
or bylaws or only in the bylaws. This ambiguity stems from the wording of KBS
(Continued on next page)
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vision for this possibility in its former deadlock statute2°8 and has
continued to recognize such a possibility in the deadlock provisions of the new Business Corporation Law.20 9 Dissolution is

made available even in the presence of veto arrangements causing
deadlock. On the other hand, North Carolina, by amendment
to its corporation statute in 1959,210 took steps to curtail the availability of dissolution in such circumstances. 211 The provision on

shareholder deadlock, as amended, permits dissolution when it is
established that "the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power,
otherwise than by virtue of special provisions or arrangements
designed to create veto power among the shareholders,and for
that reason have been unable at two consecutive annual meetings
to elect successors to directors whose terms had expired."21 '
It is possible that the portion of the Kentucky deadlock
statute concerned with shareholder deadlock might apply to deadlock growing out of veto arrangements. This portion of the
statute refers to inability of the persons owning or controlling the
voting shares "to agree on, or vote for, the election of a board of
directors consisting of an uneven number." Unanimity or high
vote requirements could result in the condition of voting inability
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

271.345(4), the pertinent portion of which states that "Except as otherwise
provided in the articles or bylaws: . . . (c) A majority of the board of directors
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, unless the bylaws
provide that a different number shall constitute a quorum, which in no case
shall be less than one-third of the total number of directors nor less than two
directors." Ambiguities such as this could be avoided by inclusion of a provision
in the corporation statute such as the one contained in the new South Carolina
Business Corporation Act to the effect that "any provision which may properly
appear in the bylaws may be included in the articles of incorporation." S.C. Code
Ann. § 12-16.1 (a (Supp. 1962). For a similar provision see Md. Code Ann. Art.
23,§ 4(c) (1957).
208 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 108.
209 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1104(b).
210 See Editor's Note, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(a) (2) (repl. vol. 1960).
211 This action by the North Carolina legislature may seem somewhat surprising in view of a comment made by Dean Elvin R. Latty of the Duke University
Law School in 1956, shortly after enactment of the new North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, that "it would be a serious matter to give to associates in close
corporations a partner-like veto through statutory tolerance of unanimity requirements, high vote and high quorum requirements and other partner-like co-control
features and yet, despite the deadlocks thereby arising, to provide no 'out' b
dissolution or otherwise." Latty, The Close Corporation and the New Noth
Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C. L. Rev. 432, 447-48 (1956). However, the new statutory provision does help to preserve the integrity of shareholder
veto arrangements. Furthermore, the limitation thereby imposed on the power
of the court to dissolve a deadlocked corporation applies only to the paragrap h
of the statute devoted to shareholder deadlock and does not apply to the
paragraph involving deadlock of both directors and shareholders.
12 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(a) (2) (repl. vol. 1960). (Emphasis added.)
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referred to by the statute. 213 However, the portion of the statute
concerned with complete deadlock clearly contemplates voting
deadlock resulting from equally divided factions of directors and
shareholders. Any revision of the Kentucky deadlock statute
should no doubt make clear whether dissolution is to be available
under the statute despite veto arrangements, as in New York, or is
to be subject to such veto arrangements, as in North Carolina. On
the merits, it can be persuasively argued that "the statutes should
be phrased to permit dissolution whenever for the requisite period
the shareholders are unable to hold an effective election of directors in compliance with the requirements of any applicable
statute, article or by-law."21 4
3. Directoratecomposed of an uneven number
The emphasis in the portion of the Kentucky deadlock statute
concerned with shareholder deadlock on the inability of shareholders to elect a board of directors consisting of an uneven
number makes it possible for a "holdover" board to continue in
office indefinitely despite deadlock among the shareholders if the
board is an odd-numbered board. Florida, which also has a
deadlock statute based on equally divided ownership interests,
amended its statute in 1955 so as to authorize a petition for
involuntary dissolution "where the ownership is equally divided
and the number of directors is uneven, but the two halves of the
ownership are unable to agree on or elect successor directors
and the old directors are holding over." 1 5 This provision had
previously predicated the petition for dissolution, as in Kentucky,
on a showing that "the holders of the two halves of stock voting
power are unable to agree on the election of a board of directors
consisting of an uneven number." 16 If the present Kentucky
213 Under such circumstances owneks of one-half or more of the voting stock
would appear to be eligible to bring a suit to obtain appointment of a receiver as
provided for in KRS 271.570(2), despite presence of the veto provision, since
paragraph (7) of KRS 271.315 permitting the articles or bylaws to specify the
votes necessary for the transaction of business is prefaced by the clause "subject
to the provisions of this chapter with respect to the vote that shall be required
for a specific action.
214 Hetherington, Trends in Legislation for Close Corporations:A Comparison

of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law of 1951 and the New York Business
CorporationLaw of 1961, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 92, 122.

, , Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.28 (1956).
See History and Source of Law, 18 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.28 (1956). The
new Florida close corporation "act also contains provisions covering corporate
deadlock. See 2 P-H Corp. Serv., Fla. 16 (1963).
2 16
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deadlock statute is retained, then it would appear desirable to
amend it so as to make dissolution available in cases of shareholder deadlock despite the existence of a "holdover" board.17
One advantage to a shareholder deadlock provision of the
type found in the Model Business Corporation Act is that dissolution is made available regardless of the number of directors
if the shareholders are unable for a period covering two consecutive annual meeting dates to elect successors to directors whose
terms would have expired.2 18 Furthermore, if dissolution under
this provision is construed as unqualified by any outside commercial limitations, then it would be available to cover situations
of prolonged complete deadlock which under the director deadlock paragraph of the Model Act carries the legislative qualification that irreparable injury to the corporation be established. 219
4. Shareholders' agreements for dissolution
Several of the recently enacted corporation statutes afford an
additional solution to the problem of the "locked-in" minority
shareholder by giving specific statutory recognition to shareholders' agreements for dissolution. North Carolina pioneered in
this respect by providing in its new Business Corporation Act
that a court shall have power to liquidate the assets and business
of a corporation in an action by a shareholder when it is established that "all of the present shareholders are parties to, or are
transferees or subscribers of shares with actual notice of a written
agreement, whether embodied in the charter or separate therefrom, entitling the complaining shareholder to liquidation or
dissolution of the corporation at will or upon the occurrence of
some event which has subsequently occurred." 22 0 A statutory pro217 In a 1961 revision of the dissolution sections of the Maine general
corporation law, provisions were added authorizing dissolution at the suit of a
shareholder in corporations having no more than ten shareholders (regardless of
whether the corporation is solvent or earning profits) whenever it is made to
appear that the shareholders and directors are equally divided or that "the
number of directors is uneven, but the 2 factions of the ownership are unable
to agree on or elect successor directors and the old directors are holding over."
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 53, § 104 (Supp. 1961). See also Md. Code Ann. Art.
23, § 52(e) (1957); Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 155, § 50 (1959); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 1701.91(A)(4) (Page Supp. 1962).
218 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 90(a)(3) (1959).
219 See Tingle, The Stockholder's Remedy of Corporate Dissolution 171-72
(1959).
220 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(a) (3) (repl. vol. 1960).
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vision such as this enables shareholders in a close corporation to
make arrangements in advance for dissolution in the case of prolonged deadlock. Furthermore, such statutory authority removes
any question as to the validity of such arrangements, a matter of
potential importance since it is not entirely clear that such arrangements, at least if made a part of the corporate structure by
appearing in the articles or bylaws, would be upheld as valid in
the absence of statute.221
A possible weakness in the North Carolina statutory provision
is the fact that it appears in the section of the corporation statute
devoted to involuntary dissolution by decree of court and there
is thus no assurance that dissolution agreements made pursuant
to the statutory authority thereby given will be treated as selfexecuting if the circumstances calling for dissolution as prescribed by the agreement should develop. 22 New York has
modified the North Carolina approach by authorizing the inclusion of a provision in the articles of incorporation giving to any
shareholder (or to any specified number or proportion of shares
or of any class or series thereof) the power to require the dissolution of a corporation "at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event."223 If the articles contain such a provision, dissolution
can be accomplished by the filing of a certificate of dissolution
with the department of state as prescribed by the statute. 224 In
other words, this is made a form of nonjudicial dissolution in New
221 Compare Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 Yale L.J. 1040, 1047 (1950), with Israels, The Sacred Cow of
Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev.
778, 791-92 (1952). Professor William L. Cary, now Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, has expressed the opinion that, under Illinois law, a
provision in the articles calling for dissolution at the will of a single shareholder
would likely be fruitless because it would conflict with the procedure for
voluntary dissolution prescribed by the Illinois Business Corporation Act, which
provides for such dissolution either by written consent of all the shareholders or
by resolution of the board of directors accompanied by at least a two-third's
vote of the shares. Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy PartnershipAdvantages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 427, 437-38
(1953). The situation in Kentucky would be similar since voluntary dissolution
under the Kentucky general corporation statute follows the same general pattern
as in Illinois, except that the requisite shareholder vote is a "majority of the
voting power" instead of a two-third's vote and except that a shareholders' meeting for the purpose of voting on the question of dissolution may be called by
twenty per cent of the voting stock as well as by the board of directors. See KRS
271.500.
222 See Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L.
Rev. 1, 66 (1961).
223 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1002.
224 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1003,
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York rather than a form of judicial dissolution as in North Carolina.
In New York, any such advance arrangement must be incorporated in the articles. Moreover, by the express terms of the
statute, the existence of any such provision in the articles must
be noted conspicuously on the face or back of all certificates for
shares issued by the corporation. 225 The requirements for use of
such shareholder agreements are thus more rigid than in North
Carolina. However, whatever the technical differences may be
between the New York and North Carolina statutory approaches,
the important point is that in both of these states advance shareholder arrangements for dissolution carry statutory sanction and
do not depend on the uncertainty of judicial approval independently of statute.
CONCLUSION

The intent of the foregoing discussion has been to focus attention on recent legislative developments in close corporation
law which if reflected in the Kentucky general corporation statute
Would make it more responsive to the needs of the close corporation. It has been remarked that "legislation designedly applicable
to the closely held corporation has been conspicuously absent,
leaving the courts without legislative guidance as to appropriate
policy."2 6 However, there is reason to believe that this hiatus in
corporation statutes will gradually disappear as more and more
state legislatures respond to the renewed interest by the legal
profession in the affairs of the close corporation. No doubt considerable impetus for such legislative response will come from the
newly enacted New York Business Corporation Law with its
numerous provisions oriented to the practical needs of the closely
held enterprise.
Although the legislative gap in close corporation law has
already been narrowed in New York as well as in several other
states, the opportunity still remains for Kentucky to become one
of the first states to "modernize" its corporation statute in this
respect. It may be arguable, of course, whether this modernization should come piecemeal by way of amendments to the present
22
5 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1002.
226 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law

and Practice § 157, at 190 (1959).
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general corporation statute or should come as part of an overall
revision of the entire statute. The present Kentucky general
corporation statute was enacted in 1946. Although the passage of
seventeen years may not be a long period of time in terms of
legal history, it marks a period of significant developments in
corporate legislation. During this period the American Bar Association Model Business Corporation Act made its appearance
and the corporation statutes of some twenty-three states were
either completely or substantially revised.22 During 1968, the
Oregon legislature approved extensive amendments to the Oregon
Business Corporation Act, which had been adopted just ten years
previously. These amendments have been described as amounting
"almost to a complete revision" of the act,228 illustrating the
rapidity with which a supposedly "modern" corporation statute
can become outdated even in a single state.
Corporation law is a dynamic subject and corporation statutes
must of necessity be continually "modernized" if they are to keep
pace with the changes in the law required to enable businessmen
to utilize most effectively the corporate device as the vehicle for
their business activities. It is believed that the legislative trends
with respect to the close corporation reflected in the foregoing
discussion are trends in which Kentucky should cultivate a
genuine interest if the Kentucky general corporation statute is to
serve the citizens of Kentucky as well as the corporation statutes
of other states are being made to serve the citizens of those states.
22 7
228

See 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 1, II 4.01 (1960, Supp. 1962).
1 P-H Corp. Serv., Rep. Bull. No. 3, July 31, 1963, ff 3.8.

